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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)0) (2008). Pursuant to its authority 
under Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE / STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
1. Where undisputed facts establish that an island of unincorporated property 
would result from a petition to disconnect, did the district court correctly enter summary 
judgment dismissing the petition under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001) and UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7(2003). 
Standard of review: This Court should review the District Court's decision for 
correctness. See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 2006 UT 25, %9, 134 P.3d 
1116 (stating that a matter of "statutory interpretation [is] a question of law . . . 
review[ed] on appeal for correctness" and that legal conclusions of the district court on 
summary judgment are reviewed "for correctness" (further citations omitted)); see also 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C. v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, f26, 167 P.3d 1016. 
Issue Preserved at: [R. at 793-798, 1110-1112.] 
1
 Appellee City of Cedar Hills ("Cedar Hills") notes that while Appellants identified four 
separate issues for review, they failed to identify the standard of review for each issue 
and failed to provide a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court." Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(A). 
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RELEVANT STATUTES 
2001 Version of the Disconnection Statute 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will leave the 
municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, 
or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase over previous years or 
for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a 
municipality. 
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all relevant facts, 
including, but not limited to, the effect of the disconnection on: 
* * * 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shapes peninsular land masses 
result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is 
to be disconnected. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). (The full text of Section 10-2-503 is included in the 
Addendum at Tab 1.) 
*** 
(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall order 
disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in section 10-2-503. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-505 (2001). The full text of Section 10-2-505 is included in the 
Addendum at Tab 2.) 
2003 Version of the Disconnection Statute 
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, 
the court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the 
disconnection proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
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(a) the viability of the disconnection; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the 
municipality; 
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the 
cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would 
materially increase over previous years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to 
continue to function as a municipality; or 
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory; and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is 
capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs 
of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the 
municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
#*# 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7 (2003) (emphasis added). (The full text of Section 10-2-
502.7 is included in the Addendum at Tab 3. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of a petition for disconnection filed by David and Dixie 
Harvey (collectively the "Harveys") on August 8, 2001. [R. at 1-7.] The material facts 
are not in dispute. The Harveys do not dispute that their petition would result in an 
unincorporated island of approximately 12 acres projecting into Cedar Hills. [R. at 1112. 
Brief of Appellant at 13.] The single issue on appeal is whether the District Court 
properly held that unincorporated islands are prohibited under both the 2001 and 2003 
versions of the Utah disconnection statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-501 et seq. 
("Disconnection Statute"). The Disconnection Statute has existed in substantially the 
same form since 1972. The Disconnection Statute was most recently amended in 2003 
(approximately two years after the Harveys filed their petition for disconnection). The 
Harveys do not dispute that under the 2003 version, their petition is prohibited. [R. at 
1106.] Before the District Court, the Harveys asserted that the 2001 version of the 
Disconnection Statute governs and that under the 2001 version unincorporated islands, of 
themselves, are not prohibited. The District Court held that unincorporated islands are 
prohibited under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute and the 
Harvey's petition must be summarily dismissed. [R. at 1111.] 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Harveys filed for disconnection in the Fourth Judicial District Court in 2001. 
[R. at 1-7.] Cedar Hills filed a motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2006, 
challenging the Harveys' petition for disconnection. [R. at 231-38.] The Harveys filed a 
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counter-motion for partial summary judgment arguing that unincorporated islands are 
prohibited under the 2003 version of the disconnection statute but not the 2001 version 
and that their disconnection petition should be permitted. [R. at 750.] In a culmination 
of the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court heard oral argument on April 4, 
2008. [R. at 1122.] After hearing argument from both parties, the District Court ordered 
summary judgment in favor of the City, determining that both the 2001 and 2003 
versions of the disconnection statute prohibit such unincorporated islands. [Order dated 
June 3, 2008, R. at 1112.] (A copy of the District Court's June 2, 2008 Order is included 
in the Addendum at Tab 4) 
III. Disposition in the Trial Court 
As admitted by the parties, the District Court concluded that it was factually 
undisputed that disconnection of the Harvey Property from the City of Cedar Hills would 
result in an island of unincorporated property, [R. at 1112.] Disconnection would leave 
the Harvey Property as an island surrounded on all sides by either the City of Cedar Hills 
or Pleasant Grove City. [Id.] Because the creation of an unincorporated island is 
expressly prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Utah disconnection 
statute, the District Court summarily dismissed the Harveys' petition for disconnection 
and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills as to the disconnection issue. [R. at 1111.] 
The District Court certified its decision on the disconnection issue as final and 
appealable. [R. at 1110.] 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In 1996, three brothers, David Harvey, J.H. Harvey and James Harvey, 
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(collectively, the "Harvey Brothers") collectively petitioned to annex approximately 111 
acres into the municipality of Cedar Hills, Utah County, Utah. [R. at 265, 273.] (A map 
of the annexed property attached to the ordinance approving the annexation is included in 
the Addendum at Tab 5) 
2. Prior to annexation, the property was open agricultural land and no 
municipal services were directly available to any of the property to be annexed by the 
Harvey Brothers. [R. at 272-73.] 
3. To provide municipal services, Cedar Hills was required to acquire water 
rights, which it purchased from the three Harvey Brothers, and to install culinary water 
lines. [Rat270, 1038.] 
4. Cedar Hills also installed sewer lines, pressurized irrigation lines and roads 
to service the property annexed by the Harvey Brothers. [R. at 1038, 1045.] These 
improvements included installing a road from the Cedar Hills city line through a portion 
of Pleasant Grove City, which Cedar Hills donated or dedicated to Pleasant Grove at no 
charge to provide appropriate traffic flow through Cedar Hills. [Id,] 
5. Because much of the Harvey Brothers property was relatively level, at least 
compared to most of Cedar Hills, City leaders felt that a portion of the Harvey Brothers 
property would be well suited for a city park to serve the residences to be built on Harvey 
Brothers property and the surrounding community. [R. at 262, 268, 1046.] (A map of 
the area within the annexation proposed for a park, which was attached to the annexation 
ordinance, is also included in the Addendum at Tab 5.) 
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6. David and Dixie Harvey owned approximately 37.6 acres (the "Harvey 
Property") of the property that was the subject of the petition to annex filed by the 
Harvey Brothers. [R. at 288.] 
7. Approximately 1/3 or 14 acres of the Harvey Property was zoned high 
density residential. [R. at 236.] 
8. The balance of the Harvey Property, approximately 23.9 acres, was zoned 
public facility with the municipality intending to purchase all 23.9 acres from the 
Harveys for a park and a cemetery. [R. at 287.] 
9. From 1997 until 2001 the municipality negotiated with the Harveys for the 
purchase of the 23.9 acres for a park. [R. at 555.] 
10. The Harveys refused to sell the 23.9 acres for a park. [R. at 555.] 
11. On June 28 2001, the Harveys filed a request with Cedar Hills to rezone the 
23.9 to a residential zone and alternatively, filed a request with Cedar Hills to disconnect 
if the rezone was not granted. [R. at 4, 6.] 
12. The Harveys believed they would receive more money for the 23.9 acres if 
rezoned or disconnected and sold for residences. [R. at 198.] 
13. On August 7 2001, the Harveys filed a petition to disconnect with the Utah 
Fourth District Court. [R. at 1-7.] 
14. On September 5, 2001, the Harveys filed a lawsuit in the Utah Fourth 
District Court sounding in inverse condemnation claiming damages, inter alia, because 
Cedar Hills zoned the 23.9 acres public facilities and refused to rezone the property to a 
residential designation. [R. at 196-99.] 
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15. On that same September 5, 2001, Cedar Hills filed a lawsuit against the 
Harveys in eminent domain seeking to acquire the 23.9 acres for a park. [R 203-205.] 
16. In 2001 the Alpine School District filed a lawsuit in the Utah Fourth 
District Court seeking to condemn approximately half of the remaining 23.9 acres of 
Harvey Property for an elementary school and sought immediate occupancy. [R. at 209, 
235.] 
17. The Alpine School was granted immediate occupancy, its condemnation 
action has been resolved, and an elementary school, Deerfield Elementary is now on 
approximately 12 of the 23.9 acres zoned public facilities. [R. at 209, 235.] 
18. This leaves approximately 12 acres that the Harveys still desire to 
disconnect from Cedar Hills so that they can develop it into residences rather than have 
the City acquire it for a park. [R. at 198.] (A map of the Harvey Property subject to the 
disconnection petition is included in the Addendum at Tab 6.) 
19. In January of 2005, the Harveys agreed to proceed under the procedural 
steps found in the 2003 version of the Utah disconnection statute (although the Harveys 
originally filed their petition in 2001, the procedures for a petition for disconnection were 
legislatively amended in 2003). {See page 2 of Harvey's [sic] Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Determine Appropriate 
Statutory Standard, R. at 811). 
20. The Harveys admit that if the Harvey Property were disconnected from the 
City of Cedar Hills, the Harvey Property would be an island of unincoiporated property 
within Utah County. [R. at 1112, 1122 at 29:12-16; Brief of Appellant at 13.] 
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21. If disconnected the Harvey Property would be bounded entirely by Cedar 
Hills or Pleasant Grove City. [R. at 1112.] 
22. In answer to various motions for summary judgment filed by both Cedar 
Hills and the Harveys, Judge Taylor signed an Order on June 3, 2008, in which he 
summarily dismissed the Harvey's petition for disconnection because it was undisputed 
that disconnection would result in an island of unincorporated territory. [R. at 1111.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Disconnection petitions that would result in unincorporated islands are now and 
long have been prohibited by the Utah Disconnection Statute. It is undisputed that the 
Harveys' petition to disconnect from Cedar Hills would result in an island of 
unincorporated property completely surrounded by Cedar Hills and Pleasant Grove City. 
The District Court correctly entered summary judgment denying the Harveys' petition for 
disconnection because it was undisputed that it would result in an island of 
unincorporated territory in Utah County. The District Court held that unincorporated 
islands are prohibited under both the current version of the Disconnection Statute adopted 
in 2003 and the prior version as it stood in 2001 when the Harveys filed their petition to 
disconnect in court. 
The parties do not question that the present version of the Disconnection Statute 
prohibits islands. The Harveys, however, argue that the Disconnection Statute as it stood 
in 2001 did not prohibit islands. 
The 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute prohibited islands. The prohibition 
in that version was expressed in several ways. First, it evaluated islands and 
unreasonably large peninsulas together. If a peninsula is unreasonable, it is prohibited. 
Islands are treated the same as unreasonable peninsulas. Second, under the 2001 version 
satisfaction of all the disconnection factors mandated disconnection, which indicates 
failure to satisfy all factors, such as the impermissible creation of an island or 
unreasonable peninsula, mandates that disconnection must be denied. Third, the 
evaluation of islands and unreasonable peninsulas must have meaning apart from the 
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balance of the Disconnection Statute. The primary policy against islands is that they 
inherently impair municipal services. Other factors evaluate the disconnection's impact 
on all municipal services. Unless islands and unreasonable peninsulas are prohibited, this 
factor is rendered superfluous and without meaning because it duplicates the other factors 
under the Disconnection Statute. 
Whether a disconnection petition created an unincorporated island has always 
been closely considered by reviewing courts. No Utah court has approved a 
disconnection petition that created an island of unincorporated land. Because islands 
disrupt the provision of public services by the responsible governmental entity, they are 
disfavored. This public policy has always been manifest in the Disconnection Statute and 
did not change when amendments were made to the law in 2003. 
The express prohibition against all unincorporated islands in the current version of 
the Disconnection Statute merely clarified ambiguous language in the 2001 version. The 
legislative sponsors of the 2003 amendment to the Disconnection Statute stated that the 
2003 amendment clarified awkward and ambiguous language. The prohibition in the 
2003 amendment, as a clarifying statement, should be applied to prior legislative 
expressions. 
The policies against unincorporated islands are the same today as they long have 
been. Islands are prohibited because they disrupt, inhibit or impair municipal services. 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^65, 167 P.3d 1016. The 
Harveys5 petition to disconnect will impair municipal services and therefore was properly 
dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT DISCONNECTION WOULD 
IMPERMISSIBLY CREATE AN UNINCORPORATED ISLAND 
REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PETITION TO 
DISCONNECT. 
A. It Is Undisputed that Disconnection Would Create an Unincorporated 
Island Requiring Summary Judgment. 
The Harveys do not dispute that their petition to disconnect would create an island 
of unincorporated property in Utah County completely surrounded by the cities of Cedar 
Hills and Pleasant Grove. [R. at 1122: 19:11-14.] Based upon this undisputed fact, the 
District Court entered summary judgment dismissing the Harvey's petition to disconnect 
because it would result in an island of unincorporated property in Utah County. [R. at 
1111.] Summary judgment should be affirmed when the record shows "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (2008); Davis County Solid Waste Management 
v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, \% 52 P.3d 1174. 
B. Unincorporated Islands Are Expressly Prohibited by the Current 
Disconnection Statute. 
The present Disconnection Statute expressly prohibits unincorporated islands 
resulting from disconnection. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (requiring 
petitioners to show by a preponderance of evidence that a proposed disconnection would 
not "leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory"); 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^63, 167 P.3d 1016 
("Clearly, if the disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the 
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disconnection is impermissible"). The Utah Supreme Court explained the policy behind 
this prohibition stating, "islands disrupt, impair, or inhibit the provision of services and 
therefore are prohibited." Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at ^ [65. 
C. Unincorporated Islands Were Prohibited by the Prior Act. 
The 2001 Disconnection Statute prohibited islands well before the present version 
was adopted in 2003. The text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute demonstrates the intent 
to prohibit islands in two primary ways. First, the text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute, 
like the current Disconnection Statute, draws a distinction between peninsulas that offend 
the Disconnection Statute and those that do not. These offending peninsulas inherently 
impair services like islands. Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at [^67. If peninsulas were merely a 
"consideration," as the Harveys argue, there would be no need to distinguish between 
offending peninsulas that inherently impair services and those that do not. Second, if 
islands and peninsulas were merely a factor among others to be "considered," as the 
Harveys argue, then this factor becomes superfluous since it adds nothing to the 
evaluation of a disconnection petition that isn't already evaluated by other factors in the 
Disconnection Statute. 
1. The 2001 Disconnection Statute Inherently Prohibited Islands, 
Prior to 2003, the disconnection statute required courts to evaluate "whether or not 
islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or 
project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be 
disconnected." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001). The purpose of this 
requirement is plain, both islands and "unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular 
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land masses" inherently impair services. Iliis inherent ir^v-ln >^'.-< 
lihifiu'.l .lie legislature had intended tins meter to simpi> be one 
among others to be coiib -^v^ irvev^ digue, (here was no need to limit the 
consideration to "unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsulai 1 iinl masses A,N a 
mere i onsideration, all peninsulas could be readily considered and the courts could easily 
discount the minimal imparl of \iiiall peninsulas or protrusions into a iiiunicipality. 
Instead, since 1972 the legislature has required courts tn rwilnafi* i*.lands and onl) some 
offending peninsulas - those which inherently impair services because they ai e 
"unreasonably lame nv vuiinl-shaped peninsular land masses." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-
503(2)(i). Although the pre-2003 lenslr . .;• - ; . . . . . . wen^ng 
peninsula" was awkward and ambiguous, the intent seems plain. When : "^ - "i* •- -o 
large or irregularly shaped (hat it impairs services like an island, it is prohibited. 
2. The Language of the 2001 Discunru-uiun jiaiuic Addressing Islands 
Only Contains Meaning if Island < ••//••• Pmhih'f^d 
The prohibition nr~h-~t \^. - - . ,: •:Tending peninsulas m me "*•*' 
Disconnectior a.^e- die standard requirement of sum.':.^ ry 
construction that each portion of a statute earry meaning and wiltii ^eearnie ijoiii me 
balance **i me statute See Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of fiounfitid, 
2002 * * e> .,..,., iJiu S^uiii, hie w Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, 2008 Ui M, r * *"" ...-: •- e=,e .:• «, >uri . principles of 
statuto.ry construction require it uto "assume that the legislature- used earh term m Hie 
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002 15 
statute advisedly5 and to 'interpret ] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid[ ] 
rendering portions of the statute superfluous"' (further citation omitted)). 
Islands must be prohibited under the 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute or 
the statutory requirements relative to islands are rendered superfluous and without 
meaning. The 2001 version required evaluation of the impact of a petition to disconnect 
on four municipal services of water, sewer, law enforcement and zoning, plus a fifth 
express factor of "other municipal services," which would necessarily include parks and 
recreation and all other municipal services. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503(2) (2001). In 
addition, the 2001 version required the evaluation of "whether or not islands and 
unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into 
the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. 
The shape of the island is insignificant. The reason for evaluating whether islands and 
offending peninsulas result from the petition to disconnect is because they inherently 
disrupt, impair or inhibit services. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at [^65. Those would be the 
same municipal services expressly listed as other factors under the Disconnection Statute. 
As a practical and common-sense matter, an unincorporated island will always materially 
increase the cost of providing municipal services. See id. at ffif 63-65 ("Clearly, if the 
disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the disconnection is 
impermissible" because problems with unincorporated islands increase the city and 
county's costs of providing municipal services). The requirement to evaluate islands and 
offending peninsulas under the 2001 Disconnection Statute gains meaning only if that 
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factor is somehow treated differently, iiiean-no -vily a islands ami offVndiiM', peninsulas 
are prohibited. 
_ s^,^, 1'ti'jccti/ig into LiiiL.\, .,./,i .... /li/ziiv Property, Were 
Prohibited hv flu Prun-A,-* 
This Court; should reject the Harveys' argument that prior to 2003, islands * --• 
..«,:,: )l " * i . .mpc xSny were not prohibited but were merely a "consideration" 
uinaci the Diseonno-. . i&6-~>''- ; '- = ; ^-iore _003 J I B 98, 
the bill amending the Disconnection Statute in 2003, clarified that nnmcorpoialed islands 
are absolutely prohibited, prior versions of the disconnection act plainly prohibited 
islands w 11 n 111 w 11 m i 111; -11 i i h linn i n i Il' - ', jurisdiction to disconnect was 
dependent on some portion of the area seekini i- •* ••* h 4ie 
municipality. See In re West Jordan, In< . V>s> V 2d 2X6, i j Utah 2d 127 ^utah i.^o2j; 
5v-' • * i - »J * • wiiiv.MV uig a disconnection petition filed by "a 
majority of the real property owners in fenifory williin and I v mil tijHih (IK boi'ders ol any 
incorporated city or town"), ( I he full ie\t of Section ii> 4-1 is included in the \ o o -
a * .. mcation ,-, _.-;/;- ; •:•• i& that unincorporated islands, like ihe Harvey 
Property, are complex' - - • •. • : • «^- : always more than a mere 
consideration and that the legislature always intended lo prohibit the same. 
• ;•-•... .--• ci'.^ii . . oi iiu; 200] Disconnection Statute permitted a trial court 
to \}r:ini a disi «-'. ' .: - • *. -••..>.• .. • n. ,;j .lL n tcJa in the 
Disconnection Statute. Under the 2001 Disconnection StilluU ,i lnal oouM wa iijppo „(\1 
lo appoint a commission made up of three disinterested people to apply the criteria in 
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Section 10-2-503. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502(2) (2001). These commissioners 
evaluated the disconnection petition based upon the criteria in Section 10-2-503, 
including the particular language at issue: "whether or not islands or unreasonably large 
and varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries for 
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i). 
Based upon their investigation, the commissioners then made a report to the trial court. 
See id. at § 10-2-505(1). After receiving the report, the trial court could hold a hearing. 
See id. The statute then stated that "[considering all of the evidence and the 
commissioner's report, the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection 
satisfies the criteria in Section 10-2-503." Id. at § 10-2-505(4). If the proposed 
disconnection did not satisfy the criteria in Section 10-2-503, including the creation of an 
island or prohibited peninsula, then the trial court clearly could not order a disconnection. 
The argument raised by the Harveys - that under the 2001 Disconnection Statute 
the creation of unincorporated islands within a city was not a dispositive factor but 
merely one consideration among many other factors - would actually permit the approval 
of a disconnection petition even though an unincorporated island resulted, creating the 
potential for unwieldy municipal boundaries contrary to the plain intention of the statute. 
Such a suggestion goes contrary the public policy against the creation of unincorporated 
islands and lends strength to the legislators' introductory statements discussed below that 
2003 HB 98 was simply a clarifying amendment to the Disconnection Statute regarding 
islands and peninsulas and not a substantive change. As a clarification of what an island 
or offending peninsula is and a clarification that unincorporated islands and offending 
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peninsulas are prohibited (if that alieaclv vv-'isn'i '•iiHlnenflv clear), I1"' chipiyifig 
amendments in 2003 HB 98 appl)' to the Harveys' petition to disconnect and Judge 
Tayloi 's order shoi lid be affirmed. 
D. Unincorporated Islands Have Always Been Disfavored by the Law and 
the Harvey Property Will Become an Unincorporated Island with NO 
Immediate Prospect* Ml Annexing into a Municipality. 
; n^  aa-, e;?>, i^ed ii^n inert' petition should not be prohibited because the isbrd to 
be crer*4 ^ *'- *' -'pornled I Jtali i 'ouiily temporarily. \bw unej 01 
Appellant v
 ; flm lnui i< speculative at best Pleasant Grove < i • -"•• :>!y 
municipality that could possibly annex the Harvey Property. However, at the time the 
District Coin t signed his 01 der Pleasant Gi ove City was pre^,^k;w -. . sa^ IK>?^ annexing 
the Harvey Property since the annexation poliev -:l^c\r:^<- - :^- - .. 1 
not encompass the Harvey Property. PR. at i06]. 107'*
 J -der Utah's Annexation Act, 
a i ilv raiinol allompl to annex a parcel unless it has previously adopted an annexation 
policy declaration encompassing u^ ;•-- - -: • '-. . 
(2008). The Pleasant Grove annexation policy declaration has not boon modified since 
2002 and does not include the Harveys' Property. 
1, Utah Courts I lav Always Prohibited tin* Creation of I hiimorporated 
Islands. 
Once disconnected, without dispute the Harvey Property would become part of 
unincorporated I '(ah County However, no Ulati appellate court has ever affirmed a 
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disconnection that would create an unincorporated island.2 See generally Continental 
Bank & Trust Co v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979); Application of 
Peterson, 66 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah 1932) (affirming disconnection of property lying 
between Town of Moab and Grand County after noting "[i]t is not as if the segregated 
lands would leave a hiatus between one part of the town and another"). 
Utah appellate courts have always recognized statutory prohibitions against 
unincorporated islands. See Farmington City, 599 P.2d at 1247. Utah's laws governing 
annexations and disconnections both proscribe actions that would create unincorporated 
islands. According to Utah law governing statutory construction, statutory provisions 
should be interpreted "in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
Counsel for the Cedar Hills does not make this assertion lightly. Counsel conducted 
extensive research into all Utah cases it could find applying the Utah Disconnection 
Statute. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57; South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 
1994); In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1983); In re Disconnection of Territory and Restriction of the Corporate Limits of the 
City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington 
City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979); In re Disconnection of Territory from Layton City, 494 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1972); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209 
(Utah 1966); In re Disconnection of Part of the Territory of West Jordan, Inc., 369 P.2d 
286 (Utah 1962); In re Disconnection of Part of the Territory of West Jordan, Inc., 355 
P.2d 713 (Utah 1960); Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 323 P.2d 261 (Utah 1958); 
Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 281 P.2d 216 (Utah 1955); Application of Peterson, 
66 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1937); In re Peterson, 48 P.2d 468 (Utah 1935); Plutus Mining Co. v. 
Orme, 289 P. 132 (Utah 1930); In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 266 P. 1044 (Utah 
1928); In re Smithfield City, 262 P. 105 (Utah 1927); Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 
243 P. 376 (Utah 1926); In re Barton, 92 P. 770 (Utah 1907); In re Fullmer, 92 P. 768 
(Utah 1907). In some cases, Counsel was required to conduct factual research beyond 
merely reading the opinions. For example, the opinion Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of 
Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209 (Utah 1966) does not provide sufficient factual 
information to determine whether an unincorporated island was created by the 
disconnections affirmed in those cases. Counsel was required to research the 
disconnection records recorded in the Utah State Archives to find maps showing that the 
disconnections did not in fact result in the creation of an unincorporated island. 
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chapters." Miller \ Wcava\ 2003 - \2, *,;,, 66 l'.3d 592. In Farnw -<->r • 
Lag*>nn Amusemen; • appealer '•.* dismissal of its petition I disconnect from 
Farmington ( '" i - * •'"-"' :-.nnssyi • >i --e xiisconnection 
petition after reasoning, among other things, that if the disconnection were appi o\ ed, 
luiurc cxpansiu: •- « amuiigton would require "a corridor ,. . . be left open, extending 
westward ; ** .-.-rn most boundary, to avoid the creation of 
an unincorporated island in the midst of the cit\ • . : e •« • ^ 
Court in Farmington in 1°°^ the potential creation or an unincorporated island was not a 
more f'»r|nr (oi consideration K waN a dispositive factor "mandating]" denial under 
Utah law. See id. 
Before 2003, Utah appellate courts that affirmed discomiections consisted ^r;:* 
ibiiiui I hat Hie disconnection would not create an, unincorporated island, For example, in 
1983, the Utah Supreme C-- *~ <^- - -•; . . \ propenv in,:-, Highland 
Ciix' only after first concluding that "the district court found. ih:e ,KO'SUK' >>• / .J 
CJOI • * ' ;; .unds or peninsiH.»- witliin. the City's boundaries " Highland City, 668 
P.2d at 546. Siiiiilaih , (lie \ Mali Siipieiii*' Cowl ;i limned the disconnection of property 
from the City of Draper only after first finding that "' , '»br - ;-i :M-. ••,. - *.,: 
islands or peninsulas which would, leave the municipality with a residual area that would 
have the eff'--- -v; , .:•;.,_ providing municipal sendees to 
The statute that the Court rened up».»u concerned me prohibition against the creatior of 
islands by approving annexation petitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-402 (19'"?). 
Interpreting the Disconnection Statute in harmony with the related law governing 
annexations, which prohibited the creation of unincorporated islands, it is clear that *-ie 
creation of an, island should be considered dispositive. See Miller, 2003 UT 12 at % 17 
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disproportionately high or unreasonable levels. In re Disconnection of Territory and 
Restriction of the Corporate Limits of the City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699, 702-703 (Utah 
1982). Without expressly saying so, the Draper and Highland City cases strongly imply 
that if the respective disconnections would have created an unincorporated island, the 
petitions for disconnection would have been denied. 
Recent dicta from the Utah Supreme Court in the Bluffdale case also illustrates 
that Utah disconnection law has long prohibited unincorporated islands. See Bluffdale, 
2007 UT 57 at fflf 63-65. In Bluffdale, the Supreme Court applied the 2003 version of the 
Disconnection Statute, but the instruction is relevant to the history of Utah disconnection 
law. See id. Even though the facts did not invite discussion of the prohibition against 
unincorporated islands (because it was factually undisputed that disconnection would not 
create an island), the Court still took the opportunity to provide instruction regarding the 
prohibition against unincorporated islands. Id. The Court noted the policy considerations 
for prohibiting islands - that "islands disrupt, impair, or inhibit the provision of services," 
and noted that islands are unquestionably impermissible because of those policies. Id. at 
f65. The Court made those observations without citing to the 2003 version of the statute, 
and without mentioning the 2003 amendment. See id. That the Court took the time to 
discuss unincorporated islands when the facts did not require such a discussion, and the 
fact that the Court discussed the prohibition as a policy matter without relying on the 
2003 statutory language, persuasively suggests that the Court wanted to make it clear that 
Utah disconnection law has always prohibited unincorporated islands. See id. 
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2. Public Policy Prohibiting Ihiifworfumtted Islands //</v Not (luaiy}i\L 
The TTvh Legislature wi\< n n acting on any new policy considerations when it 
at- .>!<.•: - mguage m ,\u .-.seunneuion Statute in 2003 KB 98; the policy 
reasons for prohibiting un,r « - : h * .v.* : >^;ie. :ee generally 
House and Senate Floor .Debates regarding 2003 HB 98 referenced //:*•.•-• '•'••- .'f. 
Unincorporated islands have always been impermissible localise ''U oi* concern for 
symme1ric;il municipal boundaries, (,.'"') island- ; >*h • > /.};». , i.w. <.;..[.:> o-* the 
responsible county to provide services; access to the *:?• •*--\^ * •- * \ • -• be 
difficult'', and (3) islands "may impair or inhibit a city iTom providing services from one 
] • * : < - . ' " * • . : i ' / ; . . " : : / : . - : a. **. w3. uTf the county has to 
cross over incorporated land, vviiii icapcu u> %: ?•• * * ' " . . w. y services, the 
county would be required to obtain easements or assume potentially difficult negotiations 
v "• - ^ \\ii\,u\s, a Lily may have to obtain easements over the 
island in order for the cilv to provide municipal services lo propertv lutaied an all sides 
of the island. See id. "Such problems increase the county's [and city's] cost o! pro\ nhng 
iiecessai) ser vices and may ultimately render the provisions of such services 
impractical." Id, 
For the reasons described in the preceding paragraph, the Utah legislate 
lHall Supreme , u ^ :i,<\. long recognized a piamc noiicv siricliy prohibiting 
unincorporated •••• ..:• r • • ->. current!, i.-i.uu , I nie 1*\ Chapter 
2, Part 4 of the Utah Code, expressly and imamhir.: :i • • . • .mum-e 
found in the disconnection statute reads almost identical to the language found in die 
4810 8446 6435.CE003.002 o a 
annexation statute. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7 (2008) ("[T]he proposed 
disconnection will not . . . leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory.") with UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-402(l)(b) (2008) ("An 
unincorporated area may not be annexed to a municipality unless . . . annexation will not 
leave or create an unincorporated island or peninsula . . . ."). Thus, whether under the 
2001 or 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute, it is clear from the statutory language 
that a disconnection petition creating an island of unincorporated land cannot be 
approved. 
The policy reasons for prohibiting unincorporated islands are the same now as 
they have been since well before the 2003 amendments. As the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Bluffdale suggests, and as the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held over 
the years, unincorporated islands have always been prohibited because those islands 
impair counties and cities from efficiently providing municipal services. See Bluffdale, 
2007 UT 57 at ffif 63-65. Therefore, the District Court was correct in concluding that it is 
immaterial which version of the statute applies because the Harveys' petition for 
disconnection must fail under both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection 
Statute. 
II. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST UNINCORPORATED ISLANDS IN THE 
CURRENT ACT CLARIFIED WHAT WAS PROHIBITED UNDER THE 
PRIOR ACT. 
The Harveys suggest that the District Court should have determined whether the 
2003 version of the Disconnection Statute should apply retroactively. [See Brief of 
Appellant at 16.] Cedar Hills does not dispute the general rule that "statutes not 
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expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively" /" 'v Pis< oimrrfi n / 
Certain Territory fi-om Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983). However, ruling 
on i eti oactivil^ < * a: : not i equired because the District Coin I: plainly ruled that both the 
2001 and the 2003 versions of the Disconnexion Ntaluir prohibit .ill iiniiieoipuMted 
islands. fR. .-.: " '* * The District Court correctly judged that the express prohibition 
againsl •• • .:-: jorporaica ^^.uus in inc present Disconnection Statute was not materially 
different from the prohi: > -, -y •- •;•.«;.•.. . u - . , • 1 
version. [Id.] Indeed, the Distnci Loiui iieid :iuu "there is no material difference on the 
dispositive pom: v;i la., between the two versions of rthc Disconnection statute]." [hi] 
fnic *:- '"'•••: disconnection 
Statute, "if a disconnection \\ouId reov**i m a^ unineoiporaied island '* -• - .-n 
should be disallowed," [Id,] Under both versions, the Harveys5 petition would fail, but 
even if only liie .!0ul \CIMOIIJ of (lit: Disconnection .Statute applied, ttie District Court 
appropriately denied the Harveys' petition and granted si iiii mary ji ldgment to Cedai - ;s. 
A. The 2003 Amendment to the Disconnection Statute Clarified that 
Islands Are Prohibited. 
While it "-lioulil W iibnndantly vM\\\ lli.il the 'IK*1 Disconnection Statute piohibitcd 
all unincorporated islands, die 2003 amendments to the Disconnection Si-;*'. ^ 
clarification to the extent there was any ambiguity. Utah courts have long heiu ihal wucn 
•"•••'^
 :,
»*" *-*
u
 ^ "• ! • • - . • . . v.* : ua^ L — -* ^-iiinricaiivins are to be applied to 
prior less clear statutory expressions because the clarifications did n I subManth rly 
change the law. See Okland Const Co, v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208, 210- 11 
,iyiti K44<- 643*:' CBHB.00 ' 25 
(Utah 1974); State in Interest of D.B., 925 P.2d 178, 182 n. 5 (Utah Ct App. 1982) 
(quoting 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.01 (5th ed. 1993)) 
(concluding, based on a legislator's introductory statement that amendment was an 
attempt to clarify the statute, that amendment clarified existing statute—it did not 
substantively change the law). Specifically, Utah courts will not apply the "judicial 
policy against retroactive laws . . . 'where the later statute or amendment deals only with 
clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its 
enactment.5" In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 
548 (Utah 1983) (quoting Okland Construction Co., 520 P.2d at 210-11). 
When the Disconnection Statute was last amended in 2003, the legislators' 
introductory statements declared that the reworded portions were simply clarifications of 
what the law already was. Senator Bell, the Senate sponsor of 2003 HB 98, explained 
that it was "an extremely boring bill" that merely clarified the "ambiguous" and 
"awkward" language found in the disconnection statute. Senate Floor Debate Recording 
at http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Houser:::S (choose "2003 General 
Legislative Session", "Day 31 (2/19/2003)", "HB 0098"). (An electronic file of this 
recording are included with the electronic copy of this Brief. See Addendum at Tab 8.) 
Similarly, Representative Hardy, the House sponsor of 2003 HB 98, explained that 2003 
HB 98 "clarifies the criteria the courts should apply in determining the merits on a 
disconnection." House Floor Debate Recording at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House:::::H (choose "2003 General 
Legislative Session", "Day 18 (2/6/2003)", "HB 0098"). (An electronic file of this 
4810-8446-6435.CEO03.002 9fi 
recording are included with the electi 01:11c copy of this Bi ief See Addendum at I ab 8 ) 
As :i clarification, the express prohibition against islands in 2003 HB 98 should be 
apphe, .. -:;c pre-2003 expressions against islands. The Di.stri.ct Court, correctly entered 
summary judgment denying (IK* II.MW \ / disconiu'otinn pHi(iot) beuuise Ihi: Harveys did 
iio( dispute their petition would result in an island and, as 2003 HB 9b dkr 'Vd, 
disconnect,on ^ :caviug unincorporated islands are now and long have been prohibited. 
•
 5
 • -:o!]fiecliuii StiiUilc Ihal were merely '"clariii^d"J by 2003 
HB 98 necessarily were factors that were already in the statute but v / • / --v- • -J v d 
awkwardly or ambiguously, as Senator Bell mentioned. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
> - < - . . . . . ' , o \ i2003) The 
requirement addressing islands ana oiicndin^ n< 1 • ;•, . ' « * > . and 
ambiguous. That requirement was expressed as "whether or not islands or unreasonably 
large 01 varied-shapes peninsular land masses result within, or project into the boundaries 
of the municipality from which (fir innlni v v< to ho disconnected." 111 AH O »OB ANN. § 
10-2-503(2)(i) (2001).4 With the clarification in the 2003 amendments, the legislature 
further confirmed that the creation i-i .u\ inland or offending peninsula required the den ial 
of a disconnection petition V, ,< Mi \m ODI^ANN ; Id .' > < K ? / u>00<). 
4
 What amounted to an unreasonably large or -varied-shaped peninsular land mass was so 
awkward and ambiguous that 2003 HH (>8 actually tried to define what an offending 
peninsula is and even then the Utah Supreme (\>un declared that the clarified defmn. >n 
was ambiguous. Bluffdale Moulin fln,^ { : .- RfufWalr 07r ?f)(H \ II ' 5n • ^ 
167P.3d 1016. 
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B. The 2001 Disconnection Statute Was Not Limited to Unincorporated 
Islands Wholly Within Municipalities. 
The Harveys, nevertheless, argue that what constituted an island was ambiguous 
because the language of the Disconnection Statute prior to 2003 could be misread to 
mean only islands completely within and surrounded by a single city were prohibited. 
That contortion ignores the more natural reading that the terms "result within" and 
"project into" both apply to islands as expressed in the disconnection act prior to 2003. 
Whether islands are within the borders of a municipality or between the borders of two or 
more municipalities, they "impair or inhibit the ability of the responsible county to 
provide services." Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at <[[64; see also e.g. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) (affirming the denial of a 
disconnection petition because it would create an unincorporated island). The county's 
difficulty of providing services to these different types of unincorporated islands is no 
different. 
The Harveys argue that the 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute only affects 
islands created completely "within" a single municipality. See Brief of Appellant at 13. 
The policies behind the Disconnection Statute counsel against such a narrow reading. 
Islands and peninsulas that would impair or inhibit the provision of municipal services 
offend the disconnection act in both its present and prior forms. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT 
57 at ^[64-67. Providing services to a large or varied-shaped peninsula that is "within" a 
city but would be left to protrude out of that city by a disconnection may be equally 
difficult as providing services around a similar peninsula projecting into a city's borders. 
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Thus, both the terms "within' alio l^ < • • ' M 
terms "within" and "prqKo l:i\o i;v-<\ u> islands smuer die pre-2003 Disconnection 
hnvidmg services to islands either 'within" a city or islands completely 
surrounded by more than "m morpo'Mied n(\ ">»' l |»iu|ccl " ^  i « \\\ pt«.vents equal 
challenges. 
\ :u ^uuhiaUkjL^ ii. : »H> -8 should be applied to the pre-2003 disconnection 
statute * • •• " T - :i: *:-^*.-'. ,.. .,.'.:•.*»•. .useonnection procedures 
and made some substantive changes. The substantive elianj^N ran hr if 'dily 
distinguished from the clarifying language refeixed to by Senator Bell and Representative 
Hardy btvause Hi" substantia1 i liaiigc. add new requirements, such as factors that were 
not previously listed in the disconnection statute Sn In u Disi-onnn tion <*f (\-Ktiin 
Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d at 549. For example, since 2003 district courts 
are required In onsulci wlielher a proposed disconnection would leave an area in the 
county where it would be di; : : wi: ~- * s - '^ *r •<. •- - ,>s. r, --. . *MC-
from the municipality. See UTAH CODi: ANN. § 10-2-502.7(3)kh (J-'^ -.S;. i'liui iv ^uui 
llie disLunnection ,^ .s .... :^f recmlre courts to directly consider the county's ability to 
provide services to dise-oimmui jnras, although interests of justice and equity may have 
drawn a court's attention to the county's abilities. Because islands were addressed h\ *•-
•r-.-juKiiCwikiii "MMIUU I»_-JOIV. ihe 2003 amendments, tin: 2003 amendment? related to 
iv!an -'-> • i - "- -• r' .-,,
 ;;. 1tL .,ui fiance oi the law. 
Accordingly, the District (Jour1 p^perh roncludeu w. l * . •= . v« versions 
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of the Disconnection Statute prohibit islands and that the court must deny the Harvey's 
disconnection petition and grant Cedar Hills summary judgment under either version. 
III. The Harveys5 Petition to Disconnect Would Impermissibly Impair Services. 
The Harveys' petition to disconnect raises the very concerns that the legislature 
sought to address in the Disconnection Statute and that the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Bluffdale identified—that an island would impair or inhibit the provision of 
services. To provide drinking water to the property owned by the Harveys and the 
properties owned by David Harvey's two brothers, which were annexed into Cedar Hills 
at the same time, Cedar Hills purchased water rights and a well, ironically, from the 
Harvey brothers.5 [R. at 270, 1038.] Cedar Hills also installed a pressurized secondary 
irrigation water system in the road in front of the Harvey Property. [R. at 1038.] Cedar 
Hills installed sewer lines with an easement for a main collector line at the bottom or 
south side of the Harvey Property. [Id.] To better accommodate the dramatic increase in 
traffic from the many new residences on property annexed into Cedar Hills by the 
Harveys and David Harveys' brothers, and the elementary school next to the Harvey 
Property proposed for disconnection, Cedar Hills constructed, not only roads within the 
annexed area, but even constructed a connector road outside the Cedar Hills city 
boundaries and dedicated or granted that road to Pleasant Grove. [Id.] 
The impairment of parks and recreation within Cedar Hills is the primary impact 
the Harveys' petition would have on municipal services. Cedar Hills, as part of the 
5
 Cedar Hills had to submit a change of use application, converted those water rights from 
agricultural to municipal use and did all else required to provide culinary drinking water 
to the Harvey Property. 
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negotiations to annex all of the property from the three Harvey Brothers, identified the 
need for a city park. [R. at 554-58.] Absent a city park on the Harvey Property, Cedar 
Hills will not have even the standard amount of park space that it typically requires to be 
dedicated as part of its development process. Because Cedar Hills hugs the mountain 
side at the mouth of American Fork Canyon, there is very little level space for a park in 
the City. [See id.] If Cedar Hills fails to obtain the Harvey Property for a park, it is 
doubtful that any park with the features envisioned for the Harvey Property will ever be 
developed. 
Because the property is surrounded by incorporated land, there is no convenient or 
inexpensive way for Utah County to provide services to the Harvey. The Harveys5 
disconnection petition is nothing more than an attempt to avoid selling the land to Cedar 
Hills as a park so that the Harveys can instead develop the land into residences in another 
jurisdiction, presumably, but as yet unestablished, at a premium sales price. This 
disconnection is sought after David Harvey and his brothers induced Cedar Hills into 
installing all standard municipal services. The prohibition against islands was certainly 
intended to prevent such manipulations, no matter which legislative expression of the 
Disconnection Statute is applied. 
CONCLUSION 
Because both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute prohibit the 
creation of unincorporated islands, the District Court correctly dismissed the Harveys' 
petition for disconnection and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills. Therefore, 
Cedar Hills respectfully requests that the ruling of the District Court be AFFIRMED. 
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DATED: February / \ 2009, lb-
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Eric Todd Johnson 
R. Christopher Preston 
Kyle Fielding 
Attorneys for the City of Cedar Hills 
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10-2-503 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
The issue of '"justice and equity" is largely 
based on fact as found by trial court whose 
rulings should not be disturbed unless it is 
made to appeal clearly erroneous In re Laytun 
City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P2d 948 (1972) 
Decree disconnecting an 80-acre tract from 
cnVy was consistent with "justice and equity" 
where (1) the 80-acre tract was half of parcel 
and othei half was outside city boundary, (2) 
the topography of the parcel made it desirable 
to develop the entire 160 acres as one tract, (3) 
the tract within the city was without streets, 
improvements, or buildings, (4) the city was 
providing the tract with no municipal services, 
and (5) disconnection of the tract would cause 
neither an impairment of municipal functions 
nor a substantial loss of tax revenue to the city 
In re Layton Citj, 27 Utah 2d 241 494 P.2d 948 
(1972) 
The determination of what constitutes "jus-
tice and equity" turns on the facts of each 
C.J.S. — 62 C J.S Municipal Corporations 
§§ 59 to 61 
History: C. 1953, 10-2-503, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, <> 2; 1983, ch. 28, * 2; 1996, ch. 
132, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added the sub-
section designations in Subsection (1) substi-
tuted "The commissioners shall determine" for 
Y individual case, and district court's findings 
2 will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly 
3 erroneous In le Disconnection of Certain Ter-
i ritorv, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983) 
Terms of severance . 
The matter of the adjustment of the terms 
, upon which the territory shall be severed from 
the town or city is a matter that must be 
brought to the attention of the commissioners, 
and not to the court before their appointment 
j
 In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 P. 768 (1908) 
(decided under former section, authorizing 
5
 commibSioners to adjust terms) 
i Validity of pet i t ion. 
; Petition to disconnect, defective because it 
was not signed by a majority of registered 
> voters (before 1993 amendment of this section 
substituting property owners foi voters), was 
properly dismissed South Jordan City v Sandy 
i City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) 
"The court for the purposes of determining 
whether or not terntor}' should be disconnected 
shall consider", in Subsection (2) substituted 
"In making that determination, the commis-
sion" for "The court" in the introductor} lan-
guage and made stylistic and related changes 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection. 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the 
cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially 
increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or 
practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. 
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all 
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on: 
(a) the city or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning, 
(h) other municipal services; and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped 
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the 
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. 
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Disconnection warranted. 
INCORPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES 1 0 - 2 - 5 0 5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS prejudiced by disconnection other than by the 
loss of property taxes; disconnection would not 
„ . . r„r t r,r, i create islands or peninsulas which would leave 
Retroactivity of 1983 amendment.
 fche d t y w i f c h a r e g i d u a l a r e a t h a f c w o u W h a v e 
Disconnection warranted. t n e effect of increasing the cost of providing 
Disconnection of an area from the city was services to disproportionately high or unrea-
warranted where the area was wholly agricul- sonable levels; and there was ample room for 
tural in nature; the city did not have a munici- growth and development of the city without the 
pal sewer system and it was not likely that it area. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 
would acquire one; there was no municipal 646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982). 
water system within the city and no negotia-
tions for the purchase of a water system had Retroactivity of 1983 amendment. 
occurred; there had been no municipal improve- The 1983 amendment to this section, adding 
ments within the area; the city had provided the requirement of consideration of the commu-
minimal police and fire protection; there was an nity as a whole and adjoining owners, alters the 
absence of common social, economic, and geo- substantive law and does not have retroactive 
graphic interests between the area and the city; application. In re Disconnection of Certain Ter-
there was no evidence that the city would be ritory, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 59 to 61. 
10-2-504. Commissioners' hear ing and report . 
(1) Within 30 calendar days of their appointment, the commissioners shall 
hold a public hearing. 
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the commissioners 
shall notify the parties and the public of the public hearing by publishing a 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or if there 
is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places 
within the municipality. 
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents 
regarding the disconnection proposal. 
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the commissioners shall report 
to the court their findings and reasons regarding: 
(a) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503; 
(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected 
that have accrued during the time in which the territory was part of the 
municipality; and 
(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality and the territory to 
be disconnected. 
History: C. L953, 10-2-504, enacted by SL ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the 
l 977, ch. 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 4. " section. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
10-2-505. Court action* 
(1) Upon receiving the commissioners' report, the court may, upon request of 
a
 Party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing. 
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(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence presented by petitioners 
and the municipality regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove the viability of the 
disconnection and that justice and equity require that the territory be 
disconnected from the municipality by a preponderance of the evidence 
(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court 
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria m 
Section 10-2-503 
(5) The court's ordei either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be m 
writing with findings and reasons 
History. C. 1953, 10-2-505, enacted by L. merit effective April 29, 1996, r emote the 
1977, ch*48, * 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 5. section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend 
10-2-506. Taxes to meet municipal obligations. 
(1) If the court orders a disconnection of territory from a mun ic ipa l^ , the 
court shall also order the county legislative body to levy taxes on the property 
within the disconnected territory that may be required to pay the territory's 
proportionate share of the municipal obligations accrued while the territory 
was part of the municipality 
(2) An} tax levy ordered b} the court under Subsection (1) shall be collected 
bj the count}7 treasurer in the same manner as though the disconnected 
t emto r \ were a municipality 
(3) The county treasurei shall pay to those entities named by the court the 
revenue received from that tax lev} 
History: C. 1953, 10-2-506, enacted b\ L the court ordeis a disconnection of territory 
1977, ch. 48, * 2; 1993, ch. 227, * 30; 1996, from a municipality and accrued while the 
ch. 132, ^ 6. t e rn t o n was part of the municipality," in Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend section (2) inserted "undei Subsection (1)' and 
ment effective April 29 1996, added the sub made s t \hs t ic and related changes 
section designations in Subsection (11 added ' If 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Payment of bonded indebtedness in favor of severance without imposition of 
Foimer section vested in the couit the powei terms and where the indebtedness for the 
to impose taxes to be levied on the detached u ater and sewei svstem was incurred after 
terntorv in pioper cases but it did not impose filing of petition for withdiawal and the sewer 
an obligation to pa) an\ portion of towns s\stem was not available to petitionei and the 
bonded indebtedness as a condition to v\ ith vvatei svstem did not benefit the petitioner In 
diavval at least wheic the commission decided re Peterson 92 Utah 212 66 P2d 1195 (1937) 
10-2-507. Decree — Filing of documents — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy 
of the ordei and a transparent lepioducible copy of the map or plat in the 
countv recoidei -» office 
(2) Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection ordei the munici-
p a l ^ shall file amended articles of incorporation in the lieutenant governor's 
and county recoiders office^ 
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10-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection — De-
terminat ion by municipal legislative body — Pe-
tit ion in district court. 
(1) Within 30 calendar days after the last publication of notice required 
under Subsection 10-2-501(3)(a), the legislative body of the municipality in 
which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall hold a public 
hearing. 
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the municipal 
legislative body shall provide notice of the public hearing: 
(a) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county 
in which the area proposed for disconnection is located; and 
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within 
the municipality or, if there is none, then by posting notice of the hearing 
in at least three public places within the municipality. 
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents 
regarding the disconnection proposal. 
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the municipal legislative body 
shall: 
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and 
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an 
ordinance approving disconnection of the area from the municipality. 
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legis-
lative body's determination under Subsection (4) may be filed in district 
court by: 
(i) petitioners; or 
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is 
located. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the 
request for disconnection. 
History: C. 1953, 10-2-504, enacted by L. merit effective May 5, 2003, rewrote and re-
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 4; renum- numbered this section, which formerly ap-
bered by L. 2003, ch. 279, § 2. peared as § 10-2-504. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
10-2-502.7- Court action. 
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to 
the petition, the court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, 
conduct a court hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of 
the disconnection proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence: 
(a) the viability of the disconnection; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected 
from the municipality; 
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for 
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal 
services would materially increase over previous years; 
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(u) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the munici-
pality to continue to function as a municipality, or 
(m) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincor-
porated territory, and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is 
located is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially 
increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing 
to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the 
area due to the disconnection 
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with 
respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (n), the court shall consider all relevant 
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on 
(a) the municipality or community as a whole, 
(b) adjoining property owners, 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways, 
(d) water mams and water services, 
(e) sewer mams and sewer services, 
(f) law enforcement, 
(g) zoning, and 
(h) other municipal services 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in 
writing with findings and reasons 
History. C 1953, 10-2-505, enacted by L 
1977, ch. 48, § 2, 1996, ch 132, § 5, renum-
bered by L 2003, ch 279, § 3 
Amendment Notes — The 2003 amend 
ANALYSIS 
Conditions precedent 
Disconnection warranted 
Justice and equit) 
Conditions precedent 
Payment of some portion of bonded indebted 
ness of town was not condition precedent to 
withdrawal where for example indebtedness 
for water and sewer system was incurred after 
filing of petition foi withdraw al sewer system 
was not available to petitioner and water s\s 
tern was less available than privately owned 
system which ran thiough the land and in 
which petitioner was large ownei In re Peter 
son 92 Utah 212 66 P2d 1195 (1937) 
Before the couit can pass upon the justice 
and equity of the matter it mubt Mist determine 
judiciall} the existence of the lequisites fixed 
by the legislature Thus it must first determine 
that the required number of property owners 
were petitioners and it cannot count persons 
who intervene a^ petitioners Howard \ Town 
of N Salt Lake 3 Utah 2d 189 281 P 2d 216 
(1955) 
Disconnect ion warranted 
Disconnection of an area from the cit\ w as 
ment effective Ma) 5 2003 rewrote and re 
numbeied this section which formerly ap 
peared as § 10 2 505 
warranted where the area was wholly agncul 
tural in nature the cit\ did not have a mumc 
lpal sewei system and it was not likely that it 
would acquire one theie was no municipal 
water system within the city and no negotia 
tions foi the purchase of a water system had 
occurred there had been no municipal improve 
mentb within the aiea the city had provided 
minimal police and fire protection there was an 
absence of common social economic and geo 
graphic interests between the area and the city, 
there was no e\idence that the city would be 
prejudiced b^ disconnection other than by the 
loss of propert} taxes disconnection would not 
create islands or peninsulas which would leave 
the citv with a residual area that would have 
the effect of increasing the cost of providing 
bcr\iceb to disproportionately high or unrea 
bonable le\els and there was ample room for 
growth and development of the cit> without the 
area In ie Disconnection of Certain Territory 
646 P2d 699 (Utah 1982) 
Just ice and equity 
In the determination of what constitutes jus 
tice and equity warranting a severance the 
facts in each case under well recognized pnn 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
City of Cedar Hills, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
David C. Harvey, et. al., 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Date: June 2, 2008 
Case Number: 010403694 
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 4, 2008. The Plaintiff was 
present represented by Eric Todd Johnson, and the Defendants, David and Dixie Harvey, were 
ilso present and represented by counsel, Gordon Duval. Also present was David Church, 
representing Cedar Hills in the constitutional rights companion case. The Court ruled from the 
bench for summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection, and counsel 
for Cedar Hills prepared an order. The Harveys filed an objection to the order, which was, in 
substance, a motion to reconsider. After reviewing the proposed order and the objection, the 
Court finds and orders: 
The operative facts are undisputed. The real property that is the subject of this 
dispute is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory, either in Cedar Hills or in 
Pleasant Grove. If the Court were to grant the motion for disconnection, the order 
would effectively create an island of unincorporated land. 
The parties argued over whether the Court should proceed under the 2001 or 2003 
Page 1 of 4 
version of the Disconnection statute. 
3. After carefully comparing both versions of the Disconnection statute, the Court 
finds that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between 
the two versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of 
the Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated 
island, the disconnection should be disallowed. 
4. Because the disconnection sought by the Harveys in this matter would create an 
island of unincorporated territory as prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003 
versions of the Disconnection statute, such disconnection is DENIED, and Cedar 
Hills is GRANTED summary7 judgment as to the disconnection issue. 
5. Cedar Hills has agreed to stay the companion case for condemnation (which has 
been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number 
010404045) in this matter pending appeal of the disconnection issue. 
Accordingly, the companion claim by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for 
constitutional rights violations (which has been consolidated into the present case 
but which was previously case number 010404044) is also stayed pending appeal 
of the disconnection issue. 
6 Summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection is 
certified as final and appealable 
Dated this 3 day o f ^ 3 ^ i ^ C 2008 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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10-4-1 CITIES AND TOWNS 
Power to extend boundaries of munici- Law Review, 
pal corporation, 64 A. L. R. 1335. Basis of Annexation of Terri tory by 
Municipal Corporations, 21 Iowa L a w Re-
view 128. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESTRICTION OP CORPORATE LIMITS 
Section 10-4-1. Disconnection by peti t ion to district court. 
10-4-2. Court commissioners to adjust terms. 
10-4-3. Commissioners' report. 
10-4-4. Taxes to meet municipal obligations. 
10-4-5. Decree—Filing—Costs—-When severance complete. 
10-4-1. Disconnection by petition to district court.—Whenever a ma-
jority of the real property owners in territory within and lying upon the 
borders of any incorporated city or town shall file with the clerk of the 
district court of the county in which such territory lies a petition praying 
that such territory be disconnected therefrom, and such petition sets forth 
reasons why such territory should be disconnected from such city or town, 
and is accompanied with a map or plat of the territory sought to be dis-
connected, and designates no more than five persons who are empowered 
to act for such petitioners in such proceedings, the court shall cause a 
notice of the filing of the same to be served upon said city or town in the 
same manner as a summons in a civil action, and shall also cause notice 
to be published for a period of ten days in some newspaper having general 
circulation in such city or town. Issue shall be joined and the cause tried 
as provided for the trial of civil causes as nearly as may be. The proper 
authorities of such city or town, or any person interested in the subject-
matter of said petition, may appear and contest the granting of the same. 
History: R. S. 1898 & O. I*. 1907, ferred upon courts. In re Fullmer, 33 IT. 
§§288, 301; L. 1911, ch. 130, § 1 ; O. t,. 43, 46, 92 P . 768, following Young v. Salt 
1917, §§771, 791; R. S. 1933 & O. 1943, Lake City, 24 U. 321, 67 P . 1066. This 
15-4-1. doctrine is re-affirmed in Plutus Min. Co. 
, , _ ,
 f v. Orme, 76 U. 286, 294, 289 P . 132 (re-
Comparable Provisions. hearing denied) . 
Idaho Code 1947, §50-2401 (boundaries The legislature may delegate to the 
of ci ty or village may be altered and judiciary its au thor i ty to restr ict cor-
portion of terr i tory thereof may be ex- porate limits of a ci ty; therefore this 
eluded therefrom); § 50-2402 (peti t ion to section is constitutional. But as changing 
be filed with clerk of city or viUage); the terr i torial limits of a city is primarily 
§ 50-2403 (council or board of trustees a legislative function, courts are bound to 
may enact ordinance altering boundaries confine the exercise of the power Con-
or excluding terr i tory) . ferred upon them by the legislature within 
Iowa Code 1950, § 362.32 ( terr i tory may the expressed or necessarily implied 
be severed from any city or town; ma- language of the act so conferring such 
jor i ty of resident property owners may power. Plutus Min. Co. v. Orme, 76 U. 
bring suit in equity; court then appoints 286, 294, 289 P . 132. 
commissioners). 
2. Conditions precedent. 
Cross-Reference. Authori ty to disconnect any terr i tory 
Manner of serving summons, Rules of from the boundaries of an existing muni-
Civil Procedure, Rules 4, 5 and 6. eipality is based not only upon a com-
pliance with this section, hut upon the 
1. Constitutionality. ^ ^ further essential requirement, prescribed 
This section is valid as against claim by 10-4-2, " tha t justice and equity require 
tha t matters purely legislative are con- that such terr i tory or any par t thereof 
52 
*For the convenience of the Court, digital copies of the legislative floor debates have 
been recorded on the same compact disc containing the electronic .pdf version of Brief of 
Appellee. 
House Floor Debate Recording for 2003 HB 98 recorded on February 6, 2003, also 
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House=H (choose a2003 
General Legislative Session", "Day 18 (2/6/2003)", "HB 0098"). 
Senate Floor Debate Recording for 2003 HB 98 recorded on February 19, 2003, also 
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House^S (choose "2003 
General Legislative Session", "Day 31 (2/19/2003)", "HB 0098"). 
